WHAT AMERICA LEARNED FROM HITLER – THE IRAQ UN SANCTIONS STARRING BILL CLINTON

Attachments area

WHY WASTE CLEAN WATER ON DYING CHILDREN

Effects on the Iraqi people during sanctions[edit]

High rates of malnutrition, lack of medical supplies, and diseases from lack of clean water were reported during sanctions.[22] In 2001, the chairman of the Iraqi Medical Association’s scientific committee sent a plea to the BMJ to help it raise awareness of the disastrous effects the sanctions were having on the Iraqi healthcare system.[23]

The modern Iraqi economy had been highly dependent on oil exports; in 1989, the oil sector comprised 61% of the GNP. A drawback of this dependence was the narrowing of the economic base, with the agricultural sector rapidly declining in the 1970s. Some claim that, as a result, the post-1990 sanctions had a particularly devastating effect on Iraq’s economy and food security levels of the population.[24]

Shortly after the sanctions were imposed, the Iraqi government developed a system of free food rations consisting of 1000 calories per person/day or 40% of the daily requirements, on which an estimated 60% of the population relied for a vital part of their sustenance. With the introduction of the Oil-for-Food Programme in 1997, this situation gradually improved. In May 2000 a United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) survey noted that almost half the children under 5 years suffered from diarrhoea, in a country where the population is marked by its youth, with 45% being under 14 years of age in 2000. Power shortages, lack of spare parts and insufficient technical know-how lead to the breakdown of many modern facilities.[24] The per capita income in Iraq dropped from $3510 in 1989 to $450 in 1996, heavily influenced by the rapid devaluation of the Iraqi dinar.[24]

Iraq had been one of the few countries in the Middle East that invested in women’s education. But this situation changed from the late eighties on with increasing militarisation and a declining economic situation. Consequently, the economic hardships and war casualties in the last decades have increased the number of women-headed households and working women.[24]

Chlorine is commonly used to purify water, but because it can also be used to make poisonous chlorine gas its import was severely restricted.[25] [26] After inspecting Baghdad’s facilities, David Sole, President of the Sanitary Chemists & Technicians Association, noting a high rates of diseases from lack of clean water followed the Gulf War and sanctions, recommended that liquid chlorine be sent to Iraq todisinfect water supplies.[27]

Denis Halliday was appointed United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Baghdad, Iraq as of 1 September 1997, at the Assistant Secretary-General level. In October 1998 he resigned after a 34-year career with the UN in order to have the freedom to criticise the sanctions regime, saying “I don’t want to administer a programme that satisfies the definition of genocide[28] However, Sophie Boukhari a UNESCO Courier journalist, reports that “some legal experts are skeptical about or even against using such terminology” and quotes Mario Bettati: “People who talk like that don’t know anything about law. The embargo has certainly affected the Iraqi people badly, but that’s not at all a crime against humanity or genocide.”[29]

Halliday’s successor, Hans von Sponeck, subsequently also resigned in protest, calling the effects of the sanctions a “true human tragedy”.[30] Jutta Burghardt, head of the World Food Program in Iraq, followed them.

 

THE DOCUMENT OF TOTAL HORROR ABOUT DEPRIVING MILLIONS OF CIVILLIANS OF CLEAN WATER STARTS ON PAGE 7 – THE MOST GENOCIDAL STEP BY STEP RUINATION OF ALL OF IRAQS WATER AS PLANNED FOR BY THE ARMED FORCES AND CARRIED OUT TILL THE WAR OF 2003. THIS IS THE GENOCIDE OF 500,000 CHILDREN UNDER AGE 5 WHO CANNOT  LIVE WITH DEHYDRATING DIARHEA FOR MORE THEN A FEW DAYS AND HAD NO CLEAN WATER ANYWHERE TO REPLACE THE TOXIC LIQUID THAT WAS KILLING THEM. THE START OF THESE SANCTIONS WAS UNDER PRESIDENT GEORGE BISH SENIOR BUT TAKRN OVER AND INCREASED BY BILL CLINTON FOR HIS ENTIRE TWO TERMS. DENNIS HALLIDAY

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SEE ALSO: Sanctions and War on Iraq: In 300 words
by Citizens Concerned for the People of Iraq & Interfaith Network of Concern for the People of Iraq, 8/17/02
“Strategic Attack,” and US War Crimes – U.S. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.2, by Thomas Nagy, 11/10/02

The following is mirrored from its source at: http://www.progressive.org/0801issue/nagy0901.html with footnote citations located and added in by the ratitor.

The Secret Behind the Sanctions
How the U.S. Intentionally Destroyed Iraq’s Water Supply
by Professor Thomas J. Nagy 
Dept of Management Science, George Washington University
http://home.gwu.edu/~nagy/
The Progressive
September 2001

 

Over the last two years, I’ve discovered documents of the Defense Intelligence Agency proving beyond a doubt that, contrary to the Geneva Convention, the U.S. government intentionally used sanctions against Iraq to degrade the country’s water supply after the Gulf War. The United States knew the cost that civilian Iraqis, mostly children, would pay, and it went ahead anyway.

The primary document, “Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities,”[1] is dated January 22, 1991. It spells out how sanctions will prevent Iraq from supplying clean water to its citizens.

“Iraq depends on importing specialized equipment and some chemicals to purify its water supply, most of which is heavily mineralized and frequently brackish to saline,” the document states.

“With no domestic sources of both water treatment replacement parts and some essential chemicals, Iraq will continue attempts to circumvent United Nations Sanctions to import these vital commodities. Failing to secure supplies will result in a shortage of pure drinking water for much of the population. This could lead to increased incidences, if not epidemics, of disease.”

The document goes into great technical detail about the sources and quality of Iraq’s water supply. The quality of untreated water “generally is poor,” and drinking such water “could result in diarrhea,” the document says. It notes that Iraq’s rivers “contain biological materials, pollutants, and are laden with bacteria. Unless the water is purified with chlorine, epidemics of such diseases as cholera, hepatitis, and typhoid could occur.”

The document notes that the importation of chlorine “has been embargoed” by sanctions. “Recent reports indicate the chlorine supply is critically low.”

Food and medicine will also be affected, the document states. “Food processing, electronic, and, particularly, pharmaceutical plants require extremely pure water that is free from biological contaminants,” it says.

The document addresses possible Iraqi countermeasures to obtain drinkable water despite sanctions.

“Iraq conceivably could truck water from the mountain reservoirs to urban areas. But the capability to gain significant quantities is extremely limited,” the document states.

“The amount of pipe on hand and the lack of pumping stations would limit laying pipelines to these reservoirs. Moreover, without chlorine purification, the water still would contain biological pollutants. Some affluent Iraqis could obtain their own minimally adequate supply of good quality water from Northern Iraqi sources. If boiled, the water could be safely consumed. Poorer Iraqis and industries requiring large quantities of pure water would not be able to meet their needs.”

The document also discounted the possibility of Iraqis using rainwater. “Precipitation occurs in Iraq during the winter and spring, but it falls primarily in the northern mountains,” it says. “Sporadic rains, sometimes heavy, fall over the lower plains. But Iraq could not rely on rain to provide adequate pure water.”

As an alternative, “Iraq could try convincing the United Nations or individual countries to exempt water treatment supplies from sanctions for humanitarian reasons,” the document says. “It probably also is attempting to purchase supplies by using some sympathetic countries as fronts. If such attempts fail, Iraqi alternatives are not adequate for their national requirements.”

In cold language, the document spells out what is in store:

“Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water because of the lack of required chemicals and desalination membranes. Incidences of disease, including possible epidemics, will become probable unless the population were careful to boil water.”

The document gives a timetable for the destruction of Iraq’s water supplies.

“Iraq’s overall water treatment capability will suffer a slow decline, rather than a precipitous halt,” it says. “Although Iraq is already experiencing a loss of water treatment capability, it probably will take at least six months (to June 1991) before the system is fully degraded.”

This document, which was partially declassified but unpublicized in 1995, can be found on the Pentagon’s web site at www.gulflink.osd.mil. (I disclosed this document last fall. But the news media showed little interest in it. The only reporters I know of who wrote lengthy stories on it were Felicity Arbuthnot in the Sunday Herald of Scotland, who broke the story, and Charlie Reese of the Orlando Sentinel, who did a follow-up.)

Recently, I have come across other DIA documents that confirm the Pentagon’s monitoring of the degradation of Iraq’s water supply. These documents have not been publicized until now.

The first one in this batch is called “Disease Information,” and is also dated January 22, 1991.[2] At the top, it says, “Subject: Effects of Bombing on Disease Occurrence in Baghdad.” The analysis is blunt:

“Increased incidence of diseases will be attributable to degradation of normal preventive medicine, waste disposal, water purification/distribution, electricity, and decreased ability to control disease outbreaks. Any urban area in Iraq that has received infrastructure damage will have similar problems.”

The document proceeds to itemize the likely outbreaks. It mentions “acute diarrhea” brought on by bacteria such as E. coli, shigella, and salmonella, or by protozoa such as giardia, which will affect “particularly children,” or by rotavirus, which will also affect “particularly children,” a phrase it puts in parentheses. And it cites the possibilities of typhoid and cholera outbreaks.

The document warns that the Iraqi government may “blame the United States for public health problems created by the military conflict.”

The second DIA document, “Disease Outbreaks in Iraq,” is dated February 21, 1990, but the year is clearly a typo and should be 1991.[3] It states: “Conditions are favorable for communicable disease outbreaks, particularly in major urban areas affected by coalition bombing.” It adds:

“Infectious disease prevalence in major Iraqi urban areas targeted by coalition bombing (Baghdad, Basrah) undoubtedly has increased since the beginning of Desert Storm. . . . Current public health problems are attributable to the reduction of normal preventive medicine, waste disposal, water purification and distribution, electricity, and the decreased ability to control disease outbreaks.”

This document lists the

“most likely diseases during next sixty-ninety days (descending order): diarrheal diseases (particularly children); acute respiratory illnesses (colds and influenza); typhoid; hepatitis A (particularly children); measles, diphtheria, and pertussis (particularly children); meningitis, including meningococcal (particularly children); cholera (possible, but less likely).”

Like the previous document, this one warns that the Iraqi government might “propagandize increases of endemic diseases.”

The third document in this series, “Medical Problems in Iraq,” is dated March 15, 1991.[4] It says:

“Communicable diseases in Baghdad are more widespread than usually observed during this time of the year and are linked to the poor sanitary conditions (contaminated water supplies and improper sewage disposal) resulting from the war. According to a United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)/World Health Organization report, the quantity of potable water is less than 5 percent of the original supply, there are no operational water and sewage treatment plants, and the reported incidence of diarrhea is four times above normal levels. Additionally, respiratory infections are on the rise. Children particularly have been affected by these diseases.”

Perhaps to put a gloss on things, the document states, “There are indications that the situation is improving and that the population is coping with the degraded conditions.” But it adds: “Conditions in Baghdad remain favorable for communicable disease outbreaks.”

The fourth document, “Status of Disease at Refugee Camps,” is dated May 1991.[5] The summary says, “Cholera and measles have emerged at refugee camps. Further infectious diseases will spread due to inadequate water treatment and poor sanitation.”

The reason for this outbreak is clearly stated again.

“The main causes of infectious diseases, particularly diarrhea, dysentery, and upper respiratory problems, are poor sanitation and unclean water. These diseases primarily afflict the old and young children.”

The fifth document, “Health Conditions in Iraq, June 1991,” is still heavily censored.[6] All I can make out is that the DIA sent a source

“to assess health conditions and determine the most critical medical needs of Iraq. Source observed that Iraqi medical system was in considerable disarray, medical facilities had been extensively looted, and almost all medicines were in critically short supply.”

In one refugee camp, the document says, “at least 80 percent of the population” has diarrhea. At this same camp, named Cukurca, “cholera, hepatitis type B, and measles have broken out.”

The protein deficiency disease kwashiorkor was observed in Iraq “for the first time,” the document adds. “Gastroenteritis was killing children. . . . In the south, 80 percent of the deaths were children (with the exception of Al Amarah, where 60 percent of deaths were children).”

The final document is “Iraq: Assessment of Current Health Threats and Capabilities,” and it is dated November 15, 1991.[7] This one has a distinct damage-control feel to it. Here is how it begins:

“Restoration of Iraq’s public health services and shortages of major medical materiel remain dominant international concerns. Both issues apparently are being exploited by Saddam Hussein in an effort to keep public opinion firmly against the U.S. and its Coalition allies and to direct blame away from the Iraqi government.”

It minimizes the extent of the damage.

“Although current countrywide infectious disease incidence in Iraq is higher than it was before the Gulf War, it is not at the catastrophic levels that some groups predicted. The Iraqi regime will continue to exploit disease incidence data for its own political purposes.”

And it places the blame squarely on Saddam Hussein. “Iraq’s medical supply shortages are the result of the central government’s stockpiling, selective distribution, and exploitation of domestic and international relief medical resources.” It adds: “Resumption of public health programs . . . depends completely on the Iraqi government.”

As these documents illustrate, the United States knew sanctions had the capacity to devastate the water treatment system of Iraq. It knew what the consequences would be: increased outbreaks of disease and high rates of child mortality. And it was more concerned about the public relations nightmare for Washington than the actual nightmare that the sanctions created for innocent Iraqis.

The Geneva Convention is absolutely clear. In a 1979 protocol relating to the “protection of victims of international armed conflicts,” Article 54, it states:

“It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.”

But that is precisely what the U.S. government did, with malice aforethought. It “destroyed, removed, or rendered useless” Iraq’s “drinking water installations and supplies.” The sanctions, imposed for a decade largely at the insistence of the United States, constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention. They amount to a systematic effort to, in the DIA’s own words, “fully degrade” Iraq’s water sources.

At a House hearing on June 6, Representative Cynthia McKinney, Democrat of Georgia, referred to the document “Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities” and said: “Attacking the Iraqi public drinking water supply flagrantly targets civilians and is a violation of the Geneva Convention and of the fundamental laws of civilized nations.”[8]

Over the last decade, Washington extended the toll by continuing to withhold approval for Iraq to import the few chemicals and items of equipment it needed in order to clean up its water supply.

Last summer, Representative Tony Hall, Democrat of Ohio, wrote to then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright “about the profound effects of the increasing deterioration of Iraq’s water supply and sanitation systems on its children’s health.” Hall wrote,

“The prime killer of children under five years of age — diarrheal diseases — has reached epidemic proportions, and they now strike four times more often than they did in 1990. . . . Holds on contracts for the water and sanitation sector are a prime reason for the increases in sickness and death. Of the eighteen contracts, all but one hold was placed by the U.S. government. The contracts are for purification chemicals, chlorinators, chemical dosing pumps, water tankers, and other equipment. . . . I urge you to weigh your decision against the disease and death that are the unavoidable result of not having safe drinking water and minimum levels of sanitation.”

For more than ten years, the United States has deliberately pursued a policy of destroying the water treatment system of Iraq, knowing full well the cost in Iraqi lives. The United Nations has estimated that more than 500,000 Iraqi children have died as a result of sanctions, and that 5,000 Iraqi children continue to die every month for this reason.

No one can say that the United States didn’t know what it was doing.

 

See for Yourself

All the DIA documents mentioned in this article were found at the Department of Defense’s Gulflink site.

To read or print documents:

  1. go to gulflink.osd.mil
  2. click on “Declassified Documents” on the left side of the front page
    [http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/cgi-bin/texis/search/browse/ratitor]
  3. the next page is entitled “Browse Recently Declassified Documents”
  4. click on “search” under “Declassifed Documents” on the left side of that page
    [http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/search/declass.html]
  5. the next page is entitled “Search Recently Declassified Documents”
  6. enter search terms such as “disease information effects of bombing”
  7. click on the search button
  8. the next page is entitled “Data Sources”
  9. click on DIA
  10. click on one of the titles

It’s not the easiest, best-organized site on the Internet, but I have found the folks at Gulflink to be helpful and responsive.

Thomas J. Nagy

Thomas J. Nagy teaches at the School of Business and Public Management at George Washington University.

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  1. Excerpts of “Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities”, 22 January 1991, (emphasis added):

FM: DIA WASHINGTON DC
TO: CENTCOM
INFO: CENTAF; UK STRIKE COMMAND; MARCENT; 18 ABC; NAVCENT; SOCCENT; 7TH CORPS; ANKARA

SUBJECT: IRAQ WATER TREATMMENT VULNERABILITIES (U)
AS OF 18 JAN 91 KEY JUDGMENTS.

1. IRAO DEPENDS ON IMPORTING-SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT-AND SOME CHEMICALS TO PURIFY ITS WATER SUPPLY, MOST OF WHICH IS HEAVILY MINERALIZED AND FREQUENTLY BRACKISH TO SALINE.

2. WITH NO DOMESTIC SOURCES OF BOTH WATER TREATMENT REPLACEMENT PARTS AND SOME ESSENTIAL CHEMICALS, IRAO WILL CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS TO IMPORT THESE VITAL COMMODITIES.

3. FAILING TO SECURE SUPPLIES WILL RESULT IN A SHORTAGE OF PURE DRINKING WATER FOR MUCH OF THE POPULATION. THIS COULD LEAD TO INCREASED INCIDENCES, IF NOT EPIDEMICS, OF DISEASE….

28. THE ENTIRE IRAOI WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM WILL NOT COLLAPSE PRECIPITOUSLY…. FULL DEGRADATION OF THE WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM PROBABLY WILL TAKE AT LEAST ANOTHER 6 MONTHS.

Full document at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19950901/950901_511rept_91.html

  1. “Disease Information,” 22 January 1991, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19950901/950901_0504rept_91.html
  2. “Disease Outbreaks in Iraq,” 21 February 1990, http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19950901/950901_0pgv072_90p.html
  3. “Medical Problems in Iraq,” 15 March 1991,
    http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19951016/951016_0me018_91.html
  4. “Status of Disease at Refugee Camps,” May 1991,
    http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19950719/950719_68980446_91z.html
  5. “Health Conditions in Iraq,” June 1991,
    http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19950719/950719_60500007_91r.html
  6. “Iraq: Assessment of Current Health Threats and Capabilities,” November 15, 1991,
    http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19961031/961031_950825_0116pgv_00p.html
  7. “Oppressors at the Rein: Has the UN Commission on Human Rights Lost its Course? A Review of its Mission, Operations, and Structure,” International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Ranking Member Cynthia McKinney’s Hearing Statement, 6 June 2001,
    http://www.ratical.org/co-globalize/CynthiaMcKinney/news/pr010606.htm
  8. Document Page: First| Prev | Next | All | Image | This Release | Search
  9. File: 950901_511rept_91.txt
    Page: 91
    Total Pages: 1
  • IRAQ WATER TREATMMENT VULNERABILITIES (U)
  • Filename:511rept.91
  • DTG: 221900Z JAN 91
  • FM: DIA WASHINGTON DC
  • VIA: NMIST NET
  • TO: CENTCOM
  • INFO: CENTAF
  1. UK STRIKE COMMAND
  2. MARCENT
  3. 18 ABC
  4. NAVCENT
  5. SOCCENT
  6. 7TH CORPS
  7. ANKARA
  • SUBJECT: IRAQ WATER TREATMMENT VULNERABILITIES (U)
  1. AS OF 18 JAN 91 KEY JUDGMENTS.
  • IRAO DEPENDS ON IMPORTING-SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT-AND
  • SOME CHEMICALS TO PURIFY ITS WATER SUPPLY, MOST OF WHICH IS
  • HEAVILY MINERALIZED AND FREQUENTLY BRACKISH TO SALINE.
  • WITH NO DOMESTIC SOURCES OF BOTH WATER TREATMENT     REPLACEMENT PARTS AND SOME ESSENTIAL CHEMICALS, IRAO WILL
  • CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS TO
  • IMPORT THESE VITAL COMMODITIES.
  • FAILING TO SECURE SUPPLIES WILL RESULT IN A SHORTAGE OF
  • PURE DRINKING WATER FOR MUCH OF THE POPULATION. THIS COULD LEAD
  • TO INCREASED INCIDENCES, IF NOT EPIDEMICS, OF DISEASE AND TO
  • CERTAIN PURE-WATER-DEPENDENT INDUSTRIES BECOMING INCAPACITATED,
  • INCLUDING PETRO CHEMICALS, FERTILIZERS, PETROLEUM REFINING,
  • ELECTRONICS,PHARMACEUTICALS, FOOD PROCESSING, TEXTILES, CONCRETE
  • CONSTRUCTION,AND THERMAL POWERPLANTS.
  • IRAQ’S OVERALL WATER TREATMENT CAPABILITY WILL SUFFER A
  • SLOW DECLINE, RATHER THAN A PRECIPITOUS HALT, AS DWINDLING
  • SUPPLIES AND CANNIBALIZED PARTS ARE CONCENTRATED AT HIGHER
  • PRIORITY LOCATIONS. ALTHOUGH IRAQ IS ALREADY EXPERIENCING A LOSS
  • OF WATERTREATMENT CAPABILITY, IT PROBABLY WILL TAKE AT LEAST SIX
  • MONTHS (TO JUNE 1991) BEFORE THE SYSTEM IS FULLY DEGRADED.
  • UNLESS WATER TREATMENT SUPPLIES ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE
  • UNSANCTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, NO ADEQUATE SOLUTION
  • EXISTS FOR IRAQ’S WATER PURIFICATION DILEMMA, SINCE NO SUITABLE
  • ALTERNATIVES,INCLUDING LOOTING SUPPLIES FROM KUWAIT,
  • SUFFICIENTLY MEET IRAQI NEEDS.)
  • IRAQI WATER QUALITY. SURFACE WATER FROM THE TIGRIS AND
  • EUPHRATES RIVER SYSTEM SUPPLIES ABOUT HALF OF IRAQ’S LAND
  • AREA,INCLUDING URBAN AREAS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIES.
  • IRAQ’S REMAINING AREA, PRIMARILY RURAL, RELIES ON GROUND WATER
  • FROM WELLS.THE QUALITY OF UNTREATED WATER THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
  • VARIES WIDELY BUT GENERALLY IS POOR. HEAVY MINERALIZATION,
  • SUSPENDED SOLIDS AND,FREQUENTLY, HIGH SALINITY CHARACTERIZE
  • IRAQ’S WATER SUPPLY.ALTHoUGH IRAQ HAS MADE A CONSIDERABLE EFFORT
  • TO SUPPLY PURE WATER TO ITS POPULATION, THE WATER TREATMENT
  • SYSTEM WAS UNRELIABLE EVEN BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS
  • SALINITY CHARACTERIZE IRAO’S WATER SUPPLY.ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAS
  • MADE A CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO SUPPLY PURE WATER TO ITS
  • POPULATION, THE WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM WAS UNRELIABLE EVEN
  • BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED. MOST IRAOIS
  • PREFER TO DRINK IMPORTED BOTTLED WATER.
  • THE MINERALS IN THE WATER INCLUDE CONCENTRATIONS OF
  • CARBONATES, SULPHATES, CHLORIDES, AND, IN SOME LOCATIONS,
  • DRINKING HEAVILY MINERALIZED WATER COULD RESULT IN
  • DIARRHEA AND,OVER THE LONG TERM, STONES FORMING WITHIN THE
  • FOR INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS, PIPES AND OTHER EOUIPMENT
  • WOULD SCALE (BECOME ENCRUSTED), EVENTUALLY CAUSING PLANTS TO
  • SHUT DOWN. SCALING IN BOILERS WOULD CAUSE EXPLOSIONS IF NOT
  • PREVENTED OR REMOVED.
  • MUCH OF IRAO’S GROUND WATER SUPPLIES ARE BRACKISH TO
  • THE,LARGE RESERVOIRS NEAR BAGHDAD–THE THARTHAR, – .
  • HABBANIYAH, AND AL MILH LAKES–ARE SALINE. SINCE THESE LAKES
  • SERVE AS CATCH BASINS FOR FLOODS ON THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES
  • RIVERS, THE IRAOIS MUST REDUCE THE WATER VOLUME IN-THE LAKES
  • DURING THE LOW-WATER SEASON. EVAPARATlON DURING THE SUMMER –
  • ACCOMPLISHES THIS IMPART. SINCE REDUCING THE WATER VOLUME IN
  • THE LAKES ONLY INCREASES SALINITY, THE IRAQIS FLUSH THE LAKES
  • BY DIVERTING FRESH WATER FROM UP STREAM ON THE TIGRIS AND
  • THE FLOW IS DISCHARGED FURTHER DOWNSTREAM TO AVOID
  • FILLING THE BASINS. SINCE THE DISCHARGE OCCURS WHERE THE
  • RIVERS ENTER THE MESOPOTAMIAN PLAIN, THE DISCHARGE INCREASES
  • THE NATURAL SALINITY OF THE WATERS DOWNSTREAM, AFFECTING
  • IRRIGATED AGRICULTURAL LANDS IRAQ SPECIALIZES IN –
  • SALINE-RESISTANT CROPS SUCH AS BARLEr AND DATES) AND URBAN
  • AREAS, INCLUDING BAGHDAD.THE KARKH WATER TREATMENT PROJECT FOR
  • WESTERN BAGHDAD HAS AN IN TAKE POINT ABOUT 40 KILOMETERS NORTH
  1. OF BAGHDAD, UPSTREAM FROM WHERE LAKE THARTHAR DISCHARGES INTO
  2. THE TIGRIS. WATER BELOW THE DISCHARGE POINT REQUIRES
  3. AT BASRAH, THE SHATT AL ARAB TENDS TO BE SALINE UNDER
  4. CONDITIONS OF LOW-RIVER WATER VOLUMES AND DEPENDING ON TIDE
  5. AND WIND DIRECTIONS. NORMALLY, THE SHATT AL ARAB AT BASRAH HAS
  6. A SALINITY OF 1,500 TO 2,000 PARTS PER MILLION (PPM). SALINITY
  7. HAS BEEN INCREASING OVER THE LAST 5 YEARS, AND IN THE FALL
  8. 1989, THE SALINITY HAD REACHED 6,000 TO 7,000 PPM, HIGHER THAN
  9. EXISTING DESALINIZATION SYSTEMS COULD HANDLE. (OCEAN SEAWATER
  10. IS ABOUT 36,000 PPM OF DISSOLVED SALTS; THE PERSIAN GULF IS
  11. APPROXIMATELY 42,000 PPM.BRACKISH WATER IS A MINIMUM OF 1,000
  12. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION STANDARD FOR HUMAN
  13. CONSUMPTION IS 500 PPM OR LESS.GROUND WATER IN IRAO’S LOWER
  14. MESOPOTAMIAN BASIN RANGES FROM 5,000 TO 60,000 PPM, WITH SOME
  15. LOCATIONS REACHING 80,000). SALINE WATER IS UNFIT FOR DRINKING
  16. AND CORRODES INDUSTRIAL PIPES OR OTHER EXPOSED EQUIPMENT.
  17. (U) SUSPENDED SOLIDS, PRIMARILY SILT, IN THE TIGRIS AND
  18. EUPHRATES RIVER SYSTEM INCREASE WITH WATER VOLUME. UNLESS
  19. REMOVED FROM THE WATER, THESE PARTICLES WOULD CLOG PIPES AND
  20. FILTERS AND WOULD REQUIRE STRAINING BEFORE CONSUMPTION BY END
  21. IRAQ’S RIVERS ALSO CONTAIN BIOLOGICAL
  22. MATERIALS,POLLUTANTS, AND ARE LADEN WITH BACTERIA. UNLESS THE
  23. WATER IS PURIFIED WITH CHLORINE EPIDEMICS OF SUCH DISEASES AS
  24. CHOLERA,HEPATITIS, AND TYPHOID COULD OCCUR.)
  25. WATER TREATMENT REGIMES. WATER TREATMENT IS SPECIFIC
  26. TO THE IMPURITIES OF THE WATER TREATED AND TO THE APPLICATION
  27. FOR WHICH THE WATER WILL BE USED. THE BASIC PROCESS REQUIRES
  28. CLARIFICATION (REMOVING SUSPENDED SOLIDS), FILTRATION, AND,
  29. FOR
  30. DRINKING AND SOME INDUSTRIAL USES, PURIFICATION. IN IRAQ, THE
  31. PROCESS ALSO INCLUDES DESALINATING AND WATER SOFTENING.
  32. CLARIFICATION REQUIRES ADDING FLOCCULANTS AND
  33. COAGULANTS TO THE WATER. THE IRAOIS USE ALUMINUM SULPHATE
  34. ALTHOUGH IRON SULPHATES ARE ACCEPTABLE TO BIND THE SUSPENDED
  35. SOLIDS INTO CLUMPS FOR SETTLING. IF NOT REMOVED, THE
  36. SEDIMENTS, OR SLUDGE, WOULD CLOG THE FILTRATION SYSTEM
  37. (PROBABLY SAND) AND SHUT DOWN THE WATER PURIFICATION PLANT
  38. UNTIL THE CLOGS WERE REMOVED. ALUMINUM SULPHATE SUPPLY LEVELS
  39. ARE KNOWN TO BE CRITICALLY LOW, SINCE IRAQ TRIED AND FAILED TO
  40. OBTAIN PRECURSOR CHEMICALS FROM JORDAN FOR ITS MANUFACTURE.
  41. CHLORINATION NORMALY IS ACCOMPLISHED DURING SEVERAL
  42. STAGES OF PURIFICATION, INCLUDING THE INITAL TREATMENT STAGE
  43. TO PREVENT THE EQUIPMENT FROM LIMING AND TO KILL PATHOGENS
  44. JUST PRIOR TO STORING THE FULLY TREATED WATER. THE CHLORINE
  45. USED IN MOST PLANTS IS EITHER SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE, A LIOUID,
  46. OR CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE, A POWDER. IF THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH
  47. INJECTORS, LOW-CAPACITY PLANTS CAN USE CHLORINE GAS DIRECTLY.
  48. IRAO’S PLANT IN FALLUJA AND THE PC-I PETROCHEMICAL PLANT AT
  49. BASRAH PRODUCE SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE AND, AS A BY-PRODUCT,
  50. CAUSTIC SODA, WHICH IS USED TO ADJUST THE PH OF WATER
  51. NORMALLY, BOTH LOCATIONS PRODUCE RELATIVELY SMALL
  52. QUANTITIES OF CHLORINE FOR INDUSTRIAL AND SOME MUNICIPAL USE;
  53. CHLORINE FOR MUNICIPAL SUPPLIES ALSO IS IMPORTED.RECENT
  54. REPORTS INDICATE THE CHLORINE SUPPLY IS CRITICALLY LOW. ITS
  55. IMPORTATION HAS BEEN EMBARGOED, AND BOTH MAIN PRODUCTION
  56. PLANTS EITHER HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN FOR A TIME OR HAVE BEEN
  57. PRODUCING MINIMAL OUTPUTS BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF IMPORTED
  58. CHEMICALS AND THE INABILITY TO REPLACE PARTS. PREVIOUSLY WHEN
  59. SUPPLIES WERE LOW, THE IRAQI SHAVE STOPPED CHLORINATING THE
  60. DRINKING WATER, BUT ONLY FOR SHORT PERIODS. TO RETARD ALGAE
  61. GROWTH, WHICH COULD CLOG PIPES, COPPER SULPHATE NORMALLY IS
  62. ADDED TO THE WATER. BUT THIS PRACTICE HAS NOT BEEN VERIFIED IN
  63. IRAO, AND SUPPLIES OF COPPER SULPHATE ARE UNKNOWN.SULFURIC
  64. ACID TYPICALLY IS ADDED AS WELL, BUT IRAQ PROBABLY CAN PRODUCE
  65. SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES.
  66. IRAQ APPARENTLY USES LIME, AT LEAST AT THE NEW KARKH
  67. TREATMENT PLANT, TO SOFTEN WATER. THE LIME PRECIPITATES
  68. COLLOIDAL CARBONATE IMPURITIES FROM THE WATER. SODA ASH AND
  69. ZEOLITES ALSO NORMALLY ARE USED TO REMOVE NONCARBONATE MINERAL
  70. IMPURITIES, BUT THEIR USE IN IRAO HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.
  71. LOCAL COMPANIES SELL BOTTLED SOFT WATER IN IRAO, SUGGESTING
  72. THAT MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEMS DO NOT NORMALLY SOFTEN WATER.
  73. IRAQ SHOULD HAVE NO SHORTAGES OF LIME. HOWEVER, THE LACK OF
  74. SOFTENING CHEMICALS REPORTEDLY HAS INCAPACITATED THE BOTTLED
  75. SOFT-WATER INDUSTRY.
  76. BETWEEN 1982 AND 1990, SOME IRAOI INDUSTRIES INSTALLED
  77. REVERSIBLE ION EXCHANGE ELECTRODIALYSIS MEMBRANE SYSTEMS,
  78. OBTAINED FROM AN AMERICAN SOURCE, TO SOFTEN AND DESALINATE
  79. THE MEMBRANES LAST 5 TO 7 YEARS AND DO NOT REQUIRE
  80. CHEMICAL PRETREATMENT OF THE WATER. THEY NORMALLY SERVE
  81. SMALLER VOLUME REQUIREMENTS.HOWEVER, A MAJOR OIL REFINERY, AL
  82. DAURA IN BAGHDAD, INSTALLED THIS SYSTEM IN 1985, AND IT
  83. PRODUCES 24,000 CUBIC METERS OF PURIFIED WATER PER DAY.
  84. ABOUT ONE QUARTER OF ALL IRAOI WATER SUPPLIED FOR
  85. INDUSTRIAL AND HUMAN CONSUMPTION REQUIRES DESALINIZATION. IRAO
  86. RELIES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON ION EXCHANGE OR REVERSE OSMOSIS
  87. SYSTEMS RATHER THAN MULTISTAGE FLASH UNITS. ION EXCHANGE AND
  88. REVERSE OSMOSIS MEMBRANES ARE SPECIFIC TO THE TYPE OF
  89. EQUIPMENT OF WHICH THEY ARE A COMPONENT, AS ARE THE CHEMICALS
  90. PREVIOUS IRAQI USE OF SUBSTITUTES HAS NOT BEEN
  91. IRAO REPORTEDLY DEPENDS ON IMPORTED MEMBRANES
  92. AND IMPORTS CHEMICALS FROM SEVERAL SOURCES. IRAQ HAD NOT
  93. COMPLETED THE MAJOR PURCHASE AND DELIVERY OF SPARE MEMBRANES
  94. BEFORE INVADING KUWAIT. ATTEMPTS TO PROCURE MEMBRANES SINCE
  95. THE UN SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED HAVE FAILED. SINCE THE ATTEMPT
  96. TO IMPORT MEMBRANES CORRESPONED TO THEIR NORMAL REPLACEMENT PERIOD, IRAQ
  97. APPARENTLY DID NOT STOCKPILE ABUNDANT SPACE MEMBRANES OR CHEMICALS AND
  98. PROBABLY HAD NO MORE THAN A 2-MONTH SUPPLY PRIOR TO THE INVASION.
  99. POLYAMIDE MEMBRANES WHICH IRAO USES IN SOME
  100. DESALINIZATION EOUIPMENT, DETERIORATE WHEN EXPOSED TO CHLORINE
  101. PRIOR TO PASSING THROUGH THE MEMBRANE, WAT-ER IS TREATED
  102. WITH SODIUM METABISULPHITE TO REMOVE THE CHLORINE USED IN
  103. THE CHLORINE THEN IS RE-STORED FOR LATER
  104. THE STATUS OF SODIUM METABISULPHITE SUPPLIES IS
  105. NOT KNOWN, BUT SUPPLIES PROBABLY ARE DWINDLING, WHICH WILL
  106. ESCALATE FAILURES OF THIS MEMBRANE TYPE.IRAO ALSO USES
  107. CELLULOSE ACETATE MEMBRANES (AN OLD TECHNOLOGY),WHICH HAVE AN
  108. EXCEPTIONALLY SHORT LIFE AND ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO BIOLOGICAL
  109. IRAO REPORTEDLY CAN MANUFACTURE CELLULOSE
  110. MEMBRANES, BUT THE AVAILABILITY OF PRECURSOR STOCKS IS
  111. PROBABLY LOW.IRAQ HAD BEEN ACOUIRING REVERSE ELECTRODIALYSIS
  112. ION EXCHANGE MEMBRANES PRIOR TO THE UN SANCTIONS. HOWEVER,
  113. MOST SYSTEMS USE REVERSE OSMOSIS OR UNIDIRECTIONAL
  114. ELECTRODIALYSIS, WHICH, UNLIKE REVERSE ELECTRODIALYSIS
  115. MEMBRANES, REOUIRE CHEMICALS TO MAKE THEM WORK.)
  116. INDUSTRIAL WATER TREATMENT. INDUSTRIES REQUIRE TREATED
  117. WATER, AND THE TYPE OF TREATMENT DEPENDS ON THE
  118. NORMALLY, SOFTENING AND DESALINIZATION ARE
  119. REOUIRED TO PREVENT PIPE SAND EOUIPMENT FROM CORRODING OR
  120. IN THE PETRO CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, WATER USED FOR
  121. COOLING IS PARTIALLY TREATED TO PREVENT SCALING. WATER USED IN
  122. THERMAL POWERPLANTS OR REFINERIES TO PRODUCE STEAM MUST BE
  123. PURE TO PREVENT BOTH CORROSION AND SCALING.OTHERWISE, LOSS OF
  124. CAPABILITY COULD OCCUR WITHIN 2 MONTHS. IN ADDITION, FOOD
  125. PROCESSING, ELECTRONIC, AND, PARTICULARLY,PHARMACEUTICAL
  126. PLANTS REOUIRE EXTREMELY PURE WATER THAT IS FREE FROM
  127. BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINANTS. LARGE INDUSTRIAL PLANTS, INCLUDING
  128. PETROCHEMICAL, REFINING, AND FERTILIZER PLANTS, COLLOCATE
  129. THEIR WATER TREATMENT FACILITIES. TURNKEY CONTRACTORS BUILT
  130. THESE FACILITIES, AND THE PARTS ARE SPECIFIC TO EACH SYSTEM,
  131. WHICH COMPLICATES THEIR REPLACEMENT. THE IRAOIS COULD NOT
  132. MANUFACTURE DUPLICATES AND THEIR IMPORTATION IS EMBARGOED.)
  133. IRAQI ALTERNATIVES. IRAQ COULD TRY CONVINCING THE
  134. UNITED NATIONS OR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES TO EXEMPT WATER
  135. TREATMENT SUPPLIES FROM SANCTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS. IT
  136. PROBABLY ALSO IS ATTEMPTING TO PURCHASE SUPPLIES BY USING SOME
  137. SYMPATHETIC COUNTRIES AS FRONTS. IF SUCH ATTEMPTS FAIL, IRAQI
  138. ALTERNATIVES ARE NOT ADEOUATE FOR THEIR NATIONAL REOUIREMENTS.
  139. VARIOUS IRAOI INDUSTRIES HAVE WATER TREATMENT CHEMICAL
  140. SAND EQUIPMENT ON HAND, IF THEY HAVE NOT ALREADY BEEN CONSUMED
  141. OR BROKEN. IRAO POSSIBLY COULD CANNIBALIZE PARTS OR ENTIRE
  142. SYSTEMS FROM LOWER TO HIGHER PRIORITY PLANTS, AS WELL AS
  143. DIVERT CHEMICALS,SUCH AS CHLORINE. HOWEVER, THIS CAPABILITY
  144. WOULD BE LIMITED AND TEMPORARY. IRAQ PREVIOUSLY HAD ACQUIRED
  145. SEVERAL HUNDRED CONTAINERIZED REVERSE OSMOSIS MODULES FOR ‘
  146. LOCALIZED USE THAT COULD BE RELOCATED. WITHOUT CHEMICALS AND
  147. REPLACEMENT MEMBRANES, THESE UNITS WHERE EVENTUALLY WOULD BECOME
  148. HOWEVER, CONSOLIDATING CHEMICALS OR CANNIBALIZING
  149. PARTS AND MOVING UNITS WHERE NECESSARY COULD SUSTAIN SOME
  150. PURIFICATION OPERATIONS INDUSTRIAL PLANTS THAT ARE INOPERABLE
  151. FOR REASONS-OTHER THAN THE LACK OF WATER TREATMENT SUPPLIES
  152. COULD PROCESS WATER FOR MUNICIPAL NEEDS OR POSSIBLY RELOCATE
  153. THEIR PURIFICATION EOUIPMENT.
  154. THE DIFFERENCE IN WATER TREATMENT SYSTEMS LIMITS THE
  155. BENEFITS TO IRAQ OF PLUNDERING KUWAIT’S WATER TREATMENT
  156. THE KUWAITIS RELY PRIMARILY ON DESALINATING
  157. SEAWATER, AND THEIR WATER NEEDS ARE CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN
  158. IRAQ’S. IRAQ COULD NOT USE CHEMICALS INTENDED FOR KUWAITI
  159. WATER TREATMENT SYSTEMS, EXCEPT FOR LIMITED QUANTITIES OF
  160. ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE SANCTIONS TO OBTAIN WATER
  161. TREATMENT CHEMICALS SUGGEST THAT ANY USEFUL SUPPLIES FROM
  162. KUWAIT ALREADY HAVE BEEN LOOTED AND USED.
  163. IRAO HAS INSTALLED A PIPELINE FROM THE DOHA
  164. DESALINIZATION PLANT IN KUWAIT THAT CONNECTS WITH DISTRIBUTION
  165. PIPES AT A WATERTREATMENT PLANT NEAR BASRAH. THIS SOURCE OF
  166. PURE WATER APPARENTLY HAS ENABLED THE PC-I PETROCHEMICAL PLANT
  167. TO OPERATE AND TO PRODUCE CHLORINE BY ELECTROLYSIS OF KUWAITI
  168. WATER MIXED WITH PURE SODIUM CHLORIDE. AT LEAST SOME OF THIS
  169. CHLORINE PROBABLY IS USED FOR MUNICIPAL WATER PURIFICATION,
  170. BUT THE OUANTITY PRODUCED WOULD BE INADEOUATE FOR NATIONAL
  171. MOREOVER, SOME OF THE CHLORINE PROBABLY IS USED
  172. AT THE PC-I PLANT TO MAKE POLYVINYL CHLORIDES TO CREATE THE
  173. PLASTIC SHEETS USED IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. THE USE OF
  174. KUWAITI WATER PROBABLY WILL NOT LAST LONG SINCE THE DOHA PLANT
  175. USES THE MULTISTAGE FLASH DESALINIZATION PROCESS, WHICH
  176. REOUIRES ACID DOSING OR THE ADDITION OF POLYMERS TO PREVENT
  177. SCALING OF THE HEAT EXCHANGES. THE UN SANCTIONS MAY PREVENT
  178. RESUPPLY OF THESE CHEMICALS. INTENSIVE MAINTENANCE ALSO IS
  179. REOUIRED TO KEEP THE UNITS OPERATING, AND THAT PROBABLY WOULD
  180. REOUIRE THE SERVICES OF TRAINED KUWAITI EMPLOYEES SINCE IRAQ
  181. HAS LITTLE EXPERIENCE WITH MULTISTAGE FLASH UNITS.
  182. IRAQ’S BEST SOURCES OF QUALITY WATER ARE IN THE
  183. MOUNTAINS OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST, WHERE MINERALIZATION AND
  184. SALINITY ARE WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. FOR THE SHORT TERM,
  185. IRAO CONCEIVABLY COULD TRUCK WATER FROM THE MOUNTAIN
  186. RESERVOIRS TO URBAN AREAS. BUT THE CAPABILITY TO GAIN
  187. SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES IS EXTREMELY LIMITED. THE AMOUNT OF PIPE
  188. ON HAND AND THE LACK OF PUMPING STATIONS WOULD LIMIT LAYING
  189. PIPELINES TO THESE RESERVOIRS. MOREOVER, WITHOUT CHLORINE
  190. PURIFICATION, THE WATER STILL WOULD CONTAIN BIOLOGICAL
  191. SOME AFFLUENT IRAQIS COULD OBTAIN THEIR OWN
  192. MINIMALLY ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF GOOD OUALITY WATER FROM NORTHERN
  193. IRAOI SOURCES.IF BOILED, THE WATER COULD BE SAFELY CONSUMED.
  194. POORER IRAQIS AND INDUSTRIES REQUIRING LARGE OUANTITIES OF PURE
  195. WATER WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MEET THEIR NEEDS.
  196. PRECIPITATION OCCURS IN IRAQ DURING THE WINTER AND
  197. SPRING,BUT IT FALLS PRIMARILY IN THE NORTHERN MOUNTAINS.
  198. SPORADIC RAINS,SOMETIMES HEAVY , FALL OVER THE LOWER PLAINS.
  199. BUT IRAQ COULD NOT RELY ON RAIN TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PURE
  200. THE SALINE OR ALKALINE CONTENT-OF GROUND WATER IN MOST
  201. LOCATIONS WOULD CONSTRAIN DRILLING WELLS IN THE MESOPOTAMIAN
  202. PLAIN TO OBTAIN PURER WATER MOREOVER, MUCH OF THE POPULATION
  203. USES SEPTIC TANKS, AND THE UNDERLYING GEOLOGY AND TOPOGRAPHY
  204. WOULD CONTAMINATE WELLS IN MANY LOCATIONS.))OUTLOOK)
  205. IRAQ WILL SUFFER INCREASING SHORTAGES OF PURIFIED
  206. WATER BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF REOUIRED CHEMICALS AND
  207. DESALINIZATION MEMBRANES. INCIDENCES OF DISEASE, INCLUDING
  208. POSSIBLE EPIDEMICS,WILL BECOME PROBABLE UNLESS THE POPULATION
  209. WERE CAREFUL TO BOIL WATER BEFORE CONSUMPTION, PARTICULARLY
  210. SINCE THE SEWAGE TREATMENT SYSTEM, NEVER A HIGH PRIORITY, WILL
  211. SUFFER THE SAME LOSS OF CAPABILITY WITH THE LACK OF CHLORINE.
  212. LOCALLY PRODUCED FOOD AND MEDICINE COULD BE CONTAMINATED. LACK
  213. OF COAGULATION CHEMICALS WILL CAUSE PERIODIC SHUTDOWNS OF
  214. TREATMENT PLANTS FOR UNCLOGGING AND CLEANING FILTERS, CAUSING
  215. INTERRUPTIONS OF WATER SUPPLIES. AS DESALINIZATION EQUIPMENT
  216. BECOMES INOPERABLE, SALINE WATER SOURCES WILL BECOME
  217. INCREASINGLY UNUSABLE. TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT SHUT DOWNS OF
  218. INDUSTRIAL PLANTS THAT RELY ON TREATED WATER WILL
  219. CANNIBALIZING LOWER PRIORITY OPERATIONS WILL
  220. ACCELERATE THE TREND.
  221. THE ENTIRE IRAOI WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM WILL NOT
  222. COLLAPSE PRECIPITOUSLY, BUT ITS CAPABILITIES WILL DECLINE
  223. STEADILY AS DWINDLING SUPPLIES INCREASINGLY ARE DIVERTED TO
  224. HIGHER PRIORITY SITES WITH COMPATIBLE EQUIPMENT. KARKH, IRAO’S
  225. LARGEST WATERTREATMENT PLANT (AND ONE OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST),
  226. WAS DESIGNED TO STORE 30 DAYS OF SUPPLIES ON SITE. THE
  227. QUANTITY OF SUPPLIES, IF ANY, NORMALLY STOCKPILED IN
  228. CENTRALIZED WAREHOUSES BEFORE SHIPMENT TO TREATMENT PLANTS IS
  229. UNKNOWN, BUT A 6 MONTH TO I YEAR SUPPLY OF CHEMICALS IS THE
  230. NORMAL INDUSTRIAL PRACTICE. HOWEVER, CURRENT IRAQI EFFORTS TO
  231. OBTAIN CHEMICALS AND MEMBRANES AND THE INSTALLATION OF A
  232. PIPELINE TO OBTAIN PURE KUWAITI WATER SUGGEST THAT THERE WAS
  233. NOT ADEOUATE STOCKPILING PRIOR TO THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. SOME
  234. CHEMICALS ARE DEPLETED OR ARE NEARING DEPLETION, AND OLDER
  235. MEMBRANES ARE NOT BEING REPLACED ON SCHEDULE. CONSEOUENTLY,
  236. IRAQ PROBABLY IS USING UNTREATED OR PARTIALLY TREATED WATER IN
  237. SOME LOCATIONS. FULL DEGRADATION OF THE WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM
  238. PROBABLY WILL TAKE AT LEAST ANOTHER 6 MONTHS.
  239. [ (b)(2) ]

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